Stable cooperation in TU game models
报告人：Artem Sedakov (Saint Petersburg State University)
地点：Room 1418, Sciences Building No. 1
Abstract: The theory of cooperative games with restricted cooperation has been rapidly developing over the last decades. In the talk, we consider several TU game models which are of practical importance. We start with a game with a major player — a modified version of the landlord game assuming that the cooperation of players is restricted by a communication structure (a star-graph) as well as a coalition structure. We adopt two well-known cooperative allocations — the Myerson value and the ES-value — and provide their analytical expressions. Additionally, we examine the stability of a coalition structure using the concept of Nash equilibrium. Next, we consider a problem of stable cooperation in oligopoly, where competing firms are restricted in their outputs, and examine the stability of a coalition structure. Finally, we analyze a model of bank cooperation assuming that the banks may cooperate by optimizing their ATM networks to reduce cost. We discuss whether the bank cooperation is stable.
Info: Artem Sedakov received a PhD degree in discrete mathematics and cybernetics from Saint Petersburg State University in 2009. He is currently an associate professor at the Department of Mathematical Game Theory and Statistical Decisions, Saint Petersburg State University. His research interests focus on dynamic games, cooperation, networks, and applications.