A Promotion Spillovers: Drug Detailing in Combination Therapy
主 题: A Promotion Spillovers: Drug Detailing in Combination Therapy
报告人: 刘宏举教授 ( University of Connecticut)
时 间: 2016-11-09 16：00-17：00
地 点: 数学学院理科一号楼1569室
This paper examines the spillover effects of promotions when products from different firms are consumed in a bundle. Using data from the HIV/AIDS category, a canonical example of combination therapy, we estimate a hierarchical Bayesian logit model across treatment regimens and show that detailing for one drug can increase demand for other drugs that are often combined with the focal drug. Such spillover effects could lead to free riding by the drugs benefitting from the spillover. Using numerical dynamic programming techniques, we solve the detailing game between firms to investigate the managerial and policy implications of detailing spillover effects via counterfactual policy simulations.