Equations of motion for evolving games of competition and public good
主 题: Equations of motion for evolving games of competition and public good
Evolutionary games involve introducing time into classical game theory, and can be considered in the context of populations playing against each other and changing strategies. Spatial degrees of freedom are typically included into the strategy evolution equations by adding diffusion terms. I will discuss a more recent development, with roots in ecological modeling: non-diffusion fluxes, which for instance depend explicitly on the payoff matrix. This flux, like the evolution equation itself, can be naturally posed in terms of a fitness function for each strategy. Numerical and analytic studies of pattern dynamics will be presented, including 1D travelling wave solutions, 2D spiral patterns, and temporally oscillating fixed spatial patterns - for games such as prisoner's dilemma, rock-paper-scissors (cyclic games), and public goods games.
报告人: Andrew Belmonte (Pennsylvania State University, USA)
时 间: 2014-06-23 10:30-11:30
地 点: 理科一号楼1418教室（主持人：李铁军）